CLIMATE POLICY SUPPLEMENT
Oregon Political Culture Typology Study 2018
Data from Nov.-Dec. 2017 Opinion Survey - 1103 Respondents
Refer to PI 2018 Typology Summary Report for methodology and interpretation (on request)
PolicyInteractive Research (info@policyinteractive.org)

Oregon Political Typology - Climate Policy Focus Supplement

Reference Line	Liberal Statement (-)	1-Solid Liberals	2-Opportunity Dems	3-Disaffected Dems	4-Young Liberal Consumers	5-Apolitical C.F. Libertarians	6-Market Skeptic Rs	7-Progressive Conservatives	8 - Core Conservatives	Row Sum - top 2 lines only	Conservative Statement (+)	% total sample population
1	*Stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost.	-2.77	-1.92	-1.36	-0.07	-0.15	0.78	-0.62	1.78	-4.30	*Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the economy.	63%
2	Archetype cluster (column) % of total sample	17%	13%	13%	8%	9%	12%	11%	17%	100%		

Reference Line	Climate Policy Statement partial response - full statement on request	% agreement within cluster column membership								% unsure	Climate Policy MatrixTable Notes	% total samp.

Ref	Climate Policy Statement partial response - full statement on request	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	% unsure	% total samp.
3	Solid evidence, human-caused climate change (n=565; Q45*see text box right) ->	97%	83%	75%	30%	33%	25%	37%	9%	NA	51%
4	Climate change requires us to change our way of life such as driving less and living more simply. (n=884; Q46: strongly+lean)*	99%	99%	96%	83%	77%	74%	88%	30%	NA	80%
5	No gas tax revenue should be spent on reducing car travel (n=244; Q47)*	3%	8%	14%	10%	23%	30%	25%	58%	19%	22%
6	Join Quebec, California, and Ontario climate policy (n=582; Q50: strongly+lean)*	96%	83%	70%	41%	26%	31%	50%	10%	26%	53%
7	Binding carbon emision reduction of 3-5% each year on large businesses (n=634; Q51.1: strongly+lean)*	94%	78%	79%	54%	34%	38%	58%	17%	25%	57%
8	Join multi-state emission reduction program for a 90% emission reduction by 2050.(n=610; Q51.3: strongly+lean)*	96%	80%	75%	47%	33%	32%	52%	13%	28%	55%
9	Keep government out of climate policy business entirely.(n=547; Q51.6: strong+lean)*	4%	10%	14%	23%	33%	31%	32%	69%	26%	27%

Climate Policy MatrixTable Notes:

Climate policy matrix color key:
-Strongly support climate policy: dark blue
-Lean support climate policy:l ight blue
-Lean oppose climate policy: light red
-Strongly oppose climate policy: dark red
-Unsure column: grey

Percentages represent level of agreement within each archetype

*("n"= # of respondents on question partial; "Q"= question number)

Ref	Demographic (segment response)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	n/1103	% total
10	Prefer Republican candidates (n=449)	1%	11%	12%	54%	49%	70%	64%	98%	449	41%
11	Very Dissatisfied with Trump (n=588)	99%	87%	82%	47%	40%	26%	30%	2%	588	53%
12	Unaffiliated or independent (n=310)	23%	25%	36%	22%	41%	29%	33%	23%	310	28%
13	% Male (n=483)	40%	36%	39%	50%	35%	64%	34%	53%	483	44%
14	18-34 (n=246)	16%	19%	23%	34%	31%	24%	26%	16%	246	22%
15	Age 65+ (n=275)	24%	29%	18%	29%	19%	29%	26%	27%	275	25%
16	% with at least a 4-year college degree (n=343; Census '16 = 31%)	42%	43%	22%	28%	20%	39%	24%	24%	343	31%
17	Income in 2016 $75,000 or more (n=343)	21%	41%	24%	22%	30%	34%	35%	39%	343	31%
18	Discuss politics nearly every day (n=278)	46%	31%	18%	16%	5%	24%	16%	27%	278	25%
19	Republican Party policy threatens nation's well-being (n=406)	79%	62%	47%	30%	21%	20%	17%	2%	406	37%
20	Democratic Party policy threatens nation's well-being (n=218)	1%	1%	3%	25%	11%	26%	20%	64%	218	20%
21	Both parties threaten the nation's well-being (n=298)	18%	23%	37%	16%	46%	31%	28%	23%	298	27%

Note: Table reference line numbers do not correspond to survey question numbers. *Pew Research question

Climate Policy Focus Discussion Points:
1. Row 1 shows the only environmental topic question included in the typology question battery, indicating agreement that "environmental regulations are worth the cost" among 6 of the 8 archetype clusters, including 11% of the Progressive Conservatives leaning toward agreement. Strong agreement is expressed among Solid Liberals and Opportunity Dems, and strong opposition from Core Conservatives.

2. Row 2 is a partial response of commonly asked views concerning climate change opinion; full response from the survey found: "Hoax, it's just not happening" (4%), "There is no solid evidence, we just don't know enough yet" (16%), "Yes, due to natural patterns in Earth cycles" (21%), "Yes, due to human activity such as burning fossil fuels" (51%), and "Don't know/undecided" (8%). Only the three most left-leaning archetypes expressed majority agreement that it is human caused; this response is slightly lower than several other surveys fielded recently.

3. Row 3 shows 7 of 8 archetypes agreeing that "climate change requires us to change our way of life..." including 88% from the Progressive Conservative archetype. From the survey, 47% strongly agreed and 33% leaned towards agreement while "...if it becomes a problem we can deal with it later" found only 7% strong agreement and 13% leaning in that direction. This finding is consistent with 9 other surveys we've conducted across 10 years. The large gap between "it's not human-caused" and strong support for far-reaching behavioral responses is a topic we continue to explore, and may be due to a latent longing for a simpler way of life, irritation with highway congestion, or myriad other possible explanations. The strong overall sample support (80%) for "changing our way of life" is a full 20-30% higher than the specific policy statement propositions. Understanding this gap may yield insights to broadening agreement toward climate policy.

4. Row 4 indicates public willingness to redirect fuel tax funds paid at the pump to reduce the need to drive; only 22% responded with no funds should be diverted, while 59% selected options between ten to fifty percent diversion spending on reducing the need to drive with investments toward public transportation improvements, affordable housing near employment centers, and innovations in getting around; 19% were undecided. This high level of support might be channeled into policy if not for a state constitutional prohibition limiting transportation fuel tax to highway construction.

5. As a follow-up to row 4's question on fuel tax allocation, this survey included two questions aimed at willingness of voters to amend the state constitutional barriers (not shown in the table above) to redirecting fuel taxes to reduce the need to drive These two questions revealed less than a majority (34%) to amend the state constitution-- about equal support and opposition, with 33% undecided. Distributing the undecided respondents proportionally to the support and opposition suggests a modest majority of support, judged to be insufficient for a constitutional referral without further research. A further open-ended query asked of those who switched from support (to redirect funds) but declined or was undecided on the constitutional amendment suggests reluctance to change the constitution, perhaps due to a lack of conviction of need, or just uncertainty.

6. Rows 5, 6, 7 are representative of five questions asking for level of support for a law being considered in Oregon, currently known as the Clean Energy Jobs Act, each question containing optional short phrasings of the same policy for the purpose of exploring language-framing, with one additional reversed direction question "keep government out of climate policy entirely" as a validity check. The lead statement briefly describes the proposed act, and asks if Oregon and Washington should join California, Ontario and Quebec for a joint effort; this found 52% support, 26% undecided, and 21% opposed. Redistributing the "undecided" responses to allocate them proportionally to the agree-disagree percentages yields 68% in favor and 31% opposed, results that are consistent with five years of Oregon survey results ranging from 60-70% support when the questions did not include an "unsure" option.

7. All of the five alternative phrasings showed results within several percentage points of row 5, except for a question describing mandated carbon sequestration of large tract forestlands, where the agreement dropped by 15%, exclusively due to shifting from 'support' to 'unsure.' This corresponds to the lack of scientific consensus about the role of forest carbon sequestration, likely due to ongoing controversy between liberal and conservative attitude toward forest management.

8. Row 8's "Keep government out of the climate policy business entirely" found total support of 27%. The 'unsure' response yielded 26%, closely tracking the 'unsure' responses on the other five questions, except the forest sequestration question. The 'unsure' response indicates a fluid aspect of public support implying that a sizable percentage of the population won't become interested in this topic without new techniques of engagement.

9. The most encouraging opportunity for shared agreement on climate change policy lies in understanding the Progressive Conservatives (column 7), as may be observed in the row 1 typology environmental question, row 3 climate behavior response (88% support), and rows 5, 6, & 7 at 50-58% support, unexpected from a conservative cluster closest to Core Conservatives. Understanding that this group comprises 64% Republican preference and 33% non-aligned voters is important for finding policy agreement, and may be leveraged in speaking to conservative values such as governmental efficiency and personal efficacy.

10. Although three of the four right-leaning archetypes (columns 5, 6 & 8) show cool support for climate change policy, even 30% of the Core Conservatives think climate change requires action such as living more simply and driving less. All groups (representing 83% of the sample) except the Core Conservatives want government to be involved in the addressing climate change, shown in row 9.